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In the past few years the US and the European Union have had to react to 
the accounting scandals of Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat. During this 
process the US has served as a role model for many provisions within the 
European Union. Several regulations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were 
adopted and the European Union implemented a central information system. 
The enforcement of legal duties is also influenced by the US model, resulting
in civil liability claims gaining more importance. However, the strict criminal
sanctions are – in light of the different legal cultures understandably – not 
adopted. In the future, the US and the EU should cooperate even more, before
either passes important laws in this area unilaterally.
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I. US capital markets law – a story of success
In the past few years we have witnessed a series of scandals which have 
shaken the American stock exchanges: Enron, WorldCom as well as the con-
glomerate Tyco are among the most famous – or rather infamous examples.
Yet, the Americans reacted fast and enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.1
Today, companies have to adopt an independent audit committee.2 The Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) have to 
certify in writing that reports to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
presented the company’s economic status correctly and completely.3 Incor-
rect reports will be punished with up to 20 years imprisonment.4 A federal
judge sentenced former WorldCom Inc. chief executive Bernard J. Ebbers to
25 years imprisonment. The same happened to former Tyco boss, Dennis
Kozlowski, as well as the company’s former financial managing director,
Mark Swartz.5 It seems admirable how fast the courts punished those respon-
sible in the WorldCom and Tyco cases so strictly.
Historically, Germany was a well-known model country regarding its bank-
based financial system. However, the strong role of state and cooperative
banks, as well as corporate governance with its co-determination and the lack
of foreign banks, were blamed for causing problems in the financial system.6
In contrast, in market-based financial systems7 initial public offerings play a
more prominent role. The financing of a company via the stock exchange is
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1 Public Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, Pub.L. No. 107–204 of Jul. 30,
2002, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), which is named after two of its authors, Senator Paul Sarbanes
and Member of the House of Representatives Michael G. Oxley, “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”
(SOX). Online available at www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf and www.thomas-
moellers.de/materialien.
2 Sec. 301 SOX Act (fn. 1).
3 For Sec. 302 SOX Act (fn. 1) and Sec. 906 SOX Act as § 1350 U.S.C. see Michael Gru-
son/Matthias Kubicek, ‘Der Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Corporate Governance und das deut-
sche Aktienrecht’, Teil 1, 2, AG 2003, 304, 401 et seq.
4 Sec. 906 SOX (fn. 1) as § 1350 lit. c) (2) U.S.C.
5 In the matter of Enron Jeffrey Skilling and Kenneth Lay were found guilty on all
charges. Jeffey Skilling was sentenced to 24 years 4 months imprisonment on Oct. 23,
2006. Kenneth Lay died recently.
6 Cf. Jan Krahnen/Reinhard H. Schmidt (Eds.), The German Financial System, 2004, see
book review Ingo Tschach, Forschung Frankfurt 2/2004, 67; Jeremy S. S. Edwards/Klaus
Fischer, Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany, 1994.
7 As to the difference between both systems see Franklin Allen/Douglas Gale, Comparing
Financial Systems, 2000.
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far more common than in bank-based financial systems.8 It has not been 
decided yet which financial system is more competitive – bank-based or 
market-based.9 But it could be argued that even in Germany a pure bank-
based system does not exist any more. Banks used to have seats on super-
visory boards of outside corporations because of their blocks of shares in
those companies. But more recently banks have sold the bulk of their shares
and lost a big part of their influence on the supervisory boards – the renown-
ed “Germany Incorporated” (the “Deutschland AG”) no longer exists.10
Other core characteristics of a bank based financial system, such as the state’s
deficiency guarantee for banks (“Gewährträgerhaftung” and “Anstaltslast”),
have been limited under the pressure of the European Union.11 The investors’
interest of saving money in ordinary bank securities is decreasing. Prospec-
tive investors now would rather invest directly in companies listed on the
stock exchange.12 If banks are to avoid being put in the back seat with respect
to international business, they will have to approach investors and companies
actively and act as third party intermediaries between investors and com-
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8 See David T. Llewellyn, in: Christopher J. Green/David T. Llewellyn, Surveys in Mone-
tary Economics, 2nd Vol., 2002, pp. 210 ff.; Reinhard Schmidt/Andreas Hacketal/Marcel
Tyrell, ‘The Convergence of Financial Systems in Europe’, in: Günter Franken, Ger-
man financial markets and institutions, 2002, p. 7, 16; Axel A. Weber, ‘Finanzsysteme
im Wettbewerb’, 1/2005, See 1, 7, online available at www.bundesbank.de.
9 Cf. Vitor Gaspar/Philipp Hartmann/Olaf Sleijpen (Eds.), The Transformation of the
European financial system, 2002; ECB, Report on financial structures, 2002. The sub-
ject is still in dispute. There seems to be no proof of a correlation of growing economy
and the prevailing financial system, see Ross Levine, ‘Bank-based or Market-based 
Financial Systems: Which is Better?’, 11 Journal of Financial Intermediation, 1 et seq.
(2002).
10 Peter Mülbert, Bericht E für den 61. Deutschen Juristentag (DJT), 2000; cf. further
Carsten Jungmann, ‘The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in One-Tier and Two-
Tier-Board Systems – Evidence from the UK and Germany’, ECFR 2006, 426, 434;
Alexander Schall/Lilian Miles/Simon Goulding, ‘Promoting an Inclusive Approach on
Part of Directors: the UK and German Positions’, 6 Journal of Corporate Law Studies
299 (2006), at pp. 311, 323 et seq.
11 Germany has come to an agreement with the European Union to replace “Anstaltslast”
and to abolish state’s deficiency guarantee on Feb. 28, 2002. Thereby, the differentiation
between “Anstaltsträger” and “Gewährträgerhaftung” became void in favour of a 
unitary institution. The relevant German Act (the “Sparkassengesetz” – SpkG) follows
this proceeding: The SpkG NRW only allows for a public “ownership” effective from
July 19, 2005 pursuant § 6.
12 As to Axel A. Weber, ‘Finanzsysteme im Wettbewerb’, 01/2005, p. 10, online at www.
bundesbank.de.
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panies.13 A few examples of areas where banks can serve as a third party
intermediary are transactions on non-performing loans,14 advice on mergers
and acquisitions, private and public takeovers and the IPOs of small com-
panies. Therefore it is a logical consequence that the German and European
Market outgrow a bank-based financial system and develop into a hybrid 
financial15 system. 
While the United States looks back on a long tradition in law in respect of the
Securities Act of 1933 (SA) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA),16
the European capital markets law is only 25 years old.17 Important trans-
parency rules and regulations in the SA and SEA found their way into Euro-
pean law and from there into the national law of the member states of the
European Union. Worth mentioning are regulations regarding insider law, ad-
hoc publicity, directors dealing, and transparency on investments.18 After the
massive accounting misconduct of the Italian dairy and food giant Parmalat,
the EC also responded with a number of corporate governance initiatives.19
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13 On the challenges of “global players” cf. Josef Ackermann, ‘Geschäftsstrategien im
globalen Wettbewerb’, Die Bank 2006/05, 38. In theory on this concept Franklin Allen/
Anthony M. Santomero, ‘The theory of financial intermediation’, 21 Journal Banking
& Finance 1461 (1998).
14 As to legal questions see recently Stefan Gehrlein, Asset-backed securities, Diss. Augs-
burg 2006.
15 As to this development regarding so called hybrid systems see Jan Krahnen/Reinhard
H. Schmidt (Eds.), The German Financial System, 2004, p. 486; Axel A. Weber, ‘Finanz-
systeme im Wettbewerb’, 01/2005, p. 1, 7, online at www.bundesbank.de. As to the
adherence to traditional structures see Reinhard Schmidt/Andreas Hacketal/Marcel
Tyrell, ‘The Convergence of Financial Systems in Europe’, in: Günter Franken, Ger-
man financial markets and institutions, 2002, p. 7, 20 et seq.; Reinhard Schmidt/
Andreas Hacketal/Marcel Tyrell, ZFB 2/2002, 13 ff.
16 Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation, 4th ed. 2002; Michael Schulte, in:
Thomas M.J. Möllers/Klaus Rotter, Ad-hoc-Publizität, 2003, § 6. For the legal norms
cf. Thomas Lee Hazen, ‘Securities Regulation, Selected Statutes, Rules and Forms’ and
www.sec.gov.
17 Cf. Niahm Moloney, EC Securities Regulation, 2002; Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Secu-
rities Market, 2004; Norbert Horn, Europäisches Finanzmarktrecht, 2003; Thomas M.J.
Möllers, in: Thomas M.J. Möllers/Klaus Rotter, Ad-hoc-Publizität, 2003, § 2 n. 18 et
seq.
18 As to the information module cf. Hanno Merkt, Unternehmenspublizität, 2001, p. 140
et seq., 421; Thomas M.J. Möllers, in: Thomas M.J. Möllers/Klaus Rotter, Ad-hoc-
Publizität, 2003, § 2; Stefan Grundmann, ‘Aufbau des Informationsmodells im Euro-
päischen Gesellschaftsrecht’, DStR 2004, 232.
19 Clyde Stoltenberg/Kathleen A. Lacey/Barbara Crutchfield George/Michael Cuthbert,
‘A Comparative Analysis of Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Governance Develop-
ments in the US and European Union: The Impact of Tensions Created by Extraterri-
torial Application of Section 404’, 53 Am.J. of Comp.L. 457, 459, 478 et seq. (2005).
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Inasmuch as numerous EC member states appear on their way to a market
based financial system, it might make sense to ask whether they should con-
tinue to adopt large parts of the American approach. The advantages and dis-
advantages of adopting such an approach shall now be discussed by looking
at three particular issues: first, the European database; second, the responsi-
bilities of financial analysts; and third, the legal enforcement of these respon-
sibilities. Perhaps the best of both of these systems – the legal and financial
systems – can be combined. 
II. Duties of financial intermediaries
1. Online database for capital markets related information
As a medium for information, the internet has gained a prominent role in 
capital markets law during the last decade.20 Unfortunately a central informa-
tion system providing all disclosure information of quoted companies is still
missing. So far only a few national stock exchanges gather information about
companies and put them on their internet pages.21 A common European 
financial market is still far away since investors are still missing the relevant
information on foreign companies.22 The European Transparency Directive
2004/109/EC aims at creating a common market by means of standardizing
the national transparency rules.23 According to the new directive, quoted
companies have to disclose the relevant company information in a way that
ensures fast access to the information through media channels. These media
channels must dispose of an effective system to disseminate the information
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20 For a review on the European and German legislation cf. www.thomas-moellers.de.
21 For instance Norway has introduced a specific company information system, cf.
www.oslobors.no.
22 Cf. Art. 14 para. 2 of the EC-Treaty says: “The internal market shall comprise an area
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.”
23 Recital Nr. 1 of Dir. 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements
in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a 
regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC of Dec. 15, 2004, OJ Nr. L 390,
p. 38 (Transparency Directive) says: “Efficient, transparent and integrated securities
markets contribute to a genuine single market in the Community and foster growth and
job creation by better allocation of capital and by reducing costs. The disclosure of ac-
curate, comprehensive and timely information about security issuers builds sustained
investor confidence and allows an informed assessment of their business performance
and assets. This enhances both investor protection and market efficiency.” The directive
must be implemented by Jan. 1st, 2007.
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throughout the entire European Community.24 In addition, the directive
commits every member state to set up at least one officially appointed central
data base which easily provides information to everyone.25 In Germany, the
implementation of the Transparency Directive has caused the federal govern-
ment to set up an electronic commercial register (“Unternehmensregister”) 26
that will serve as a central information system. The “Unternehmensregister”
started its work most recently on January 20, 2007. Next to it, the duty to 
disseminate the relevant information Europe wide was implemented into
German Law in January 2007.27
By establishing a duty to inform Europe-wide, the Transparency Directive
aims at improving the transparency of company information crucially. This is
a big step to merge the by now 27 national financial markets of the European
Union into one single market. However this is only halfway gone. Firstly, the
duty to inform Europe-wide remains without effect. There is undoubtedly
no media channel in Europe which can gather Europe-wide attention. In 
order to bridge this gap, the directive obliges companies to use different
channels of information.28 This increases transaction costs and puts pressure
especially on smaller quoted companies.29 In a single market with 23 official
languages, a publication on only two or three websites or journals will not
meet the directive’s standard.30 Secondly, having regard to the wording of 
Art. 21 para. 2 of the Transparency Directive, the European legislator requi-
res the member states only to install a national information system. As a con-
sequence, in the near future 27 central information systems will be set up, one
in each member state. 
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24 Art. 21 para. 1 of the Transparency Dir. 2004/109/EC (fn. 23); § 3a para. 1 Wertpapier-
handelsanzeige- und Insiderverzeichnisverordnung (WpAIV) of Dec. 13, 2004, BGBl. I,
S. 3376.
25 Art. 21 para. 2 of the Transparency Dir. 2004/109/EC (fn. 23).
26 § 8b HGB, implemented by Gesetz über elektronische Handelsregister und Genossen-
schaftsregister sowie das Unternehmensregister (EHUG) of Nov. 10, 2006, BGBl. I
2006, 2533, cf. www.unternehmensregister.de; Thomas M.J. Möllers/Axel Lebherz, 
Kapitalmarktrecht, 2006, Going Public, 2006/05, p. 18 et seq. and www.thomas-
moellers.de.
27 Cf. § 3a para. 1 WpAIV (fn. 24), modified by Art. 2 Transparenzrichtlinie-Umset-
zungsgesetz of Jan. 5, 2007 (Act of Implementing the Transparency Dir. 2004/109/EC),
BGBl. I 2007, p. 10.
28 Art. 21 para. 2 says “media”. Cf. CESR, Final technical advice on proposals on possible
implementing measures of Transparency Dir. 2004/109/EC, June 2005, n. 31.
29 Cf. Barbara Pirner/Axel Lebherz, ‘Wie nach dem Transparenzrichtlinie-Umsetzungs-
gesetz publiziert werden muss’, AG 2007, 19, 27.
30 Bulgaria and Rumania joined the European Union on Jan. 1, 2007.
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Therefore two issues should be taken into account in order to reach the goal
of one single European platform: firstly, it will be necessary to publish at least
the relevant information of listed companies in English as lingua franca.31
This should apply even if the company is listed on the stock exchange of one
member state only. This would also give room for hope that some media
would gain importance all over Europe. Secondly, looking ahead to the future
one central information system on an EU-wide scale should be developed to
finally satisfy the directive’s intention of equal treatment for all investors.32
The result would be a transparent European capital market allowing informa-
tion flow with equal opportunities for everyone. 
In contrast, the US capital market is further developed because it already has
a central information system. All listed companies have to submit their infor-
mation to the electronic EDGAR-system.33 In addition, all reports to the
EDGAR-system are also submitted to the SEC. These EDGAR-reports are
accessible to the public through the Internet and can be retrieved on the
SEC’s homepage.34
2. Stronger supervision of financial analysts’ duties
With sec. 501 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a legal code of behaviour for finan-
cial analysts has been introduced for the first time.35 The employer must not
influence the employee.36 Salaries of financial analysts must not be connected
with investment business. In addition, obligations to disclose economic asso-
ciation with the analyzed issuer as well as financial interest in the analyzed
bond have been set up.37 However, no requirements on the content of the
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31 Under German law ad-hoc disclosures can only be published in English if the company
is seated abroad, cf. § 5 para. 2 WpAIV (fn. 24).
32 Recital No. 25 s. 2 of the Transparency Dir. 2004/109/EC (fn. 23) reads: “Investors who
are not situated in the issuer’s home member state should be put on an equal footing
with investors situated in the issuer’s home member state, when seeking access to such
information.”
33 Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval.
34 www.sec.gov.
35 The aims of the new Sec. 15D SEA can be found in the legal text in (a) No. 1: “… to
foster greater public confidence in securities research, and to protect the objectivity and
independence of securities analysts …”
36 Sec. 15D (a) SEA therefore has the title “Analyst protection”.
37 Complementary to Sec. 15D SEA, the Regulation Analyst Certification (RAC) as well
as the explanatory Release AC of SEC. Rule 472 of NYSE and Rule 2711 of NASD are
two additional rules of professional ethics containing restrictions and disclosure re-
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analysis are needed. Furthermore, in the United States journalists are ex-
cluded from the rules about financial analyses38 as long as they are not and
even should not be registered at the SEC. By all accounts the reason journa-
lists are excluded is said to be the freedom of the press.39
Considering the strong growth of legal duties of investment firms and com-
panies listed on the stock exchange,40 it is surprising that the responsibilities
of financial analysts turn out to be far less stringent. Maybe Mark Twain said
it best: “Prediction is a very difficult matter, especially if it concerns the
future.”41 However financial analysts are the “core institutions that support
strong securities markets.”42 In deciding whether to invest in markets, a pri-
vate investor acts in an economically reasonable manner when trusting a 
financial analysts’ report and not redoing all their research.43 The market 
reflects the information of the analysts’ report in the stock price.44 Small in-
vestors often trust in analysts’ professionalism; however analysts usually do
not take into account herd instinct and other irrational behavior – pheno-
mena which have been analyzed within the behavioral finance approach.45
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quirements for analysts and their employers, see Ulrich L. Göres, Interessenkonflikte
von Wertpapierdienstleistern, 2004, S. 103 et seq.; Jörg Schilder, Verhaltenspflichten von 
Finanzanalysten, 2005, S. 72; Thomas M.J. Möllers, in: Kölner Kommentar zum
WpHG, 2007, § 34a n. 40 et seq.
38 17 CFR § 242.505, Release Nos. 33-9193; 34-47384; SEC File No. S7-30-02.
39 Comparable to ratings, cf. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Husisian,
‘What standard of care should govern the world’s shortest editorials?’, 75 Cornell L.
Rev. 411, 427 (1990).
40 As to companies playing a role as monopolists of information see Thomas M.J. Möl-
lers/Franz C. Leisch, ‘Die unterlassene Ad-hoc-Mitteilung als sittenwidrige Schädi-
gung gem. § 826 BGB’, WM 2001, 1648, 1654; approving Oliver Rieckers, ‘Die Haftung
des Vorstandes für fehlerhafte Ad-hoc-Meldungen de lege lata und de lege ferenda’, BB
2002, 1213, 1217.
41 Others impute this quote to Nils Bohr, Nobel laureate in Physics.
42 Bernard S. Black, ‘The legal and institutional preconditions for strong securities mar-
kets’, 48 UCLA L.Rev. 781, 798 (2001); also Holger Fleischer, Bericht F für den 64.
DJT, 2002, p. 131.
43 As to allocative efficiency as well as further theories on efficiency Helmut Kohl/Fried-
rich Kübler/Rainer Walz/Wolfgang Wüstrich, ‘Abschreibungsgesellschaften, Kapital-
markteffizienz und Publizitätszwang – ein Plädoyer für ein Vermögensanlagegesetz –’,
ZHR 138 (1974), 1, 16 et seq.; As to the duties in general on capital markets information
Jörg Schilder, Verhaltenspflichten für Finanzanalysten, 2005, S. 39 et seq.
44 See Eugene Fama, ‘A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’, 25 J. Fin. 25 383 (1970).
45 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 1936,
p. 158: “Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally
than to succeed unconventionally”; Günter Löffler, The contribution of financial ana-
lysts to the spreading of information, 1998, p. 39 et seq.
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When defining the responsibilities of financial analysts, the European law is
very similar to American law.46 However it is more demanding in two re-
spects. Firstly, unlike in the US, financial analysts’ reports published by the
press are only allowed to be self-regulated if this self-regulation is compar-
able to a governmental control.47 This is appropriate because according to
German as well as American constitutional law freedom of speech does not
justify the publication of incorrect information.48 Secondly, the European
Commission has started to establish standards with respect to the orderly
conduct of financial analysts’ reports. Member states have to make sure that
information spread publicly by analysts is “fairly presented”. This means in
particular that the analyst’s identity has to be specified. Facts have to be
clearly distinguishable from interpretations. All sources have to be clearly in-
dicated. Recommendations must be substantiated as reasonable upon request
by the competent authorities.49 On the opposite, U.S. law has contained the
duty that a research report “provides information reasonably sufficient upon
which to base an investment decision” for a long time.50 On top of this, infor-
mation has to be complete, accurate and up-to-date. Lurid financial analyses
promising several 100 or 1.000 % price advances are therefore illegal.51
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46 Dir. 2003/6/EC of Jan. 1, 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (Market
Abuse Directive), OJ Nr. L 96, 16. For the first time, the Market Abuse Dir. 2003/6/EC
contains special rules on the behavior of financial analysts in its Art 6 para. 5. In the
course of the Lamfalussy proceeding Art. 6 para. 5 of the Market Abuse Dir. 2003/6/
EC was completed by the Dir. 2003/125/EG in order to enforce Dir. 2003/6/EG re-
garding the appropriate presentation of investment recommendations and the dis-
closure of colliding interests dated Dec. 22, 2003, OJ L 339, 73 (Enforcement Dir.
2003/125/EC).
47 Art. 3 para. 4, 5 para. 5 Enforcement Dir. 2003/125/EC of Dec. 22, 2003, OJ L 339, 73.
48 As to German law cf. BGH of Sept. 21, 1975, BGHZ 65, 325, 333; BVerfG of Oct. 12,
2000, BVerfGE 107, 347, 360 et seq.; Wolfgang Hefermehl/Helmut Köhler/Joachim
Bornkamm, Wettbewerbsrecht, 24th ed. 2005, § 5 n. 1.65 et seq.; also Helmut Schulze-
Fielitz, in: Horst Dreier, GG, 1996, Art. 5 n. 225 et seq. As to US law, cf. Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 96 Ct.
1817, 48 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1976); Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn. v. U.S., 527
U.S. 173, 119 S. Ct. 1973, 144 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1999). Cf. Husisian, ‘What standard of care
should govern the world’s shortest editorials?’, 75 Cornell L.Rev. 411 (1990).
49 Art. 2 f Enforcement Dir. 2003/125/EC (fn. 47), continuative Thomas M.J. Möllers, in:
Kölner Kommentar zum WpHG, 2007, § 34a n. 50 et seq.
50 § 15D (c) (2) SEA also Release Nos. 33-8193; NYSE 472 Definition 10 (2).
51 See in detail Thomas M. J. Möllers, in: Kölner Kommentar zum WpHG, 2007, § 34b 
n. 134 ff.
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III. Different ways of legal enforcement
1. The different plaintiffs and objective of claims in the USA
For decades a strong supervising authority for securities markets has existed
in the US (the Securities Exchange Commission – SEC). In the US, capital
markets law is a federal issue so the SEC is able to control the securities
markets all over the country. Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley company law existed
only on the state level whereas now it is  also subject to federal regulation. In
the US private plaintiffs try to recover millions of dollars through class 
actions and punitive damages or at least to urge the defendant into a settle-
ment. Pre-trial discovery allows lawyers to gain access to information about 
a defendant. With reason one might argue that the plaintiff could be called a
private prosecutor. The SEC has the power to intervene strongly. It is able to
ban someone from a profession, to claim damages and impose fines. Even
severe imprisonment may be imposed upon infringements of capital market
rules.52
2. The different plaintiffs and objective of claims in the EU
In Europe, financial regulation on the national scale has so far only been ac-
complished by the Investment Services Dir. 93/22/EEC.53 The role of civil
law in the regulation of the capital market is fairly underdeveloped. For in-
stance, it is highly controversial if the diverse duties to supply information 
to the capital market can result in private claims for damages. Nevertheless,
on the European level one can find private claims for damages in the latest 
directives.54 In Germany, liability for untrue ad-hoc disclosures has been 
introduced, and the liability for damages due to incorrect information on 
the capital market is in discussion.55 In addition, in the matters of Infoma-
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52 See above para. I. and fn. 5.
53 Dir. 93/22/EEC on investment services in the securities field of May 10, 1993, OJ 
L 141, 27.
54 Art. 7 Transparency Dir. 2004/109/EC (fn. 23); Art. 50c Directive 2006/46/EC on 
annual accounts of Jun. 14, 2006, OJ L 224, 1. From a comparison of laws perspective
cf. Klaus J. Hopt/Hans-Christoph Voigt (Eds.), Prospekt- und Kapitalmarkinforma-
tionshaftung, 2005, reviewed by Thomas M.J. Möllers, JZ 2006, 247.
55 As to §§ 37a, 37b WpHG as well as the discussed Proposal of an Act of Liability for Ca-
pital Market Information (Kapitalmarktinformationshaftungsgesetz – KapInHaG) cf.
Thomas M.J. Möllers, ‘Die Infomatec-Entscheidungen des BGH – Marksteine 
auf dem Weg zu einem Kapitalmarkt-informationshaftungsgesetz’, JZ 2005, 75 et seq.; 
Carsten Schäfer, GesRZ-SH 2005, 25 et seq.; Peter Mülbert/Steffen Steup, ‘Emittenten-
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tec56 and EM.TV 57 we find the first judgments on defective ad-hoc disclo-
sures in Germany. The Act on representative proceedings of affected in-
vestors (Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz – KapMuG)58 combines the
legal remedies of different plaintiffs. And finally, in Germany the criminalisa-
tion of market manipulation was broadly extended by the Act for the im-
provement of investor protection 59 that followed the Market Abuse Direc-
tive 2003/6/EC.60
3. Conclusions
a) Improvement of public law instruments
When looking at the enforcement of the responsibilities of the market parti-
cipants, a thorough analysis is necessary to see what is transferable from the
American capital markets law. It appears to make sense to further strengthen
control by national or even private authorities. 
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haftung für fehlerhafte Kapitalmarktinformation am Beispiel der fehlerhaften Regel-
publizität – das System der Kapitalinformationshaftung nach AnSVG und WpPG mit
Ausblick auf die Transparenzrichtlinie’, WM 2005, 1633.
56 BGH of Jul. 19, 2004, BGHZ 160, 149 = NJW 2004, 2971 (abbr.) = JZ 2005, 90 with
comments of Thomas M.J. Möllers – Infomatec I; BGH of Jul. 19, 2004, BGHZ 160,
134 = NJW 2004, 2664 – Infomatec II; BGH of Jul. 19, 2004, ZIP 2004, 1604 = NJW
2004, 2668 – Infomatec III.
57 BGH of May 9, 2005, ZIP 2005, 1270 = NJW 2005, 2450 reviewed by Thomas M.J.
Möllers, ‘Das Verhältnis der Haftung wegen vorsätzlicher sittenwidriger Schädigung
zum gesellschaftsrechtlichen Kapitalerhaltungsgrundsatz – Comroad und EM.TV’, BB
2006, 1637.
58 Gesetz zur Einführung von Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahren – KapMuG of Aug. 16,
2005, BGBl. I 2437, see Burkhard Hess, ‘Der Regierungsentwurf für ein Kapital-
anlegermusterverfahrensgesetz – eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme’, WM 2004, 2329 
et seq.; Thomas M.J. Möllers/Tilman Weichert, ‘Das Kapitalmarkt-Musterverfahrens-
gesetz (KapMuG)’, NJW 2005, 2737 et seq. Fabian Reuschle, Das Kapitalanleger-
Musterverfahrensgesetz – KapMuG, 2006; Christian Duve/Tanja V. Pfitzner, ‘Braucht
der Kapitalmarkt ein neues Gesetz für Massenverfahren?’, BB 2005, 673 et seq.; Burk-
hard Schneider, ‘Auf dem Weg zu Securities Class Actions in Deutschland? – Auswir-
kungen des KapMuG auf die Praxis kapitalmarktrechtlicher Streitigkeiten’, BB 2005,
2249 et seq.
59 Anlegerschutzverbesserungsgesetz (AnSVG) of Jul. 1, 2004, BT-Drs. 15/3493. Critics
complain that so far no punishment as per the rules regarding market price manipula-
tion has taken place, cf. Joachim Jahn, ‘Anlegerschutz hat wenig Wirkung’, FAZ of May
23. 2006, p. 21. The former CEO of Comroad AG, Bodo Schnabel, was convicted to a
prison sentence of seven years by the LG Munich, see LG München I of Nov. 21, 2002,
NStZ 2004, 291.
60 See fn. 46.
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Turning to public supervision of capital markets in Europe, it is encouraging
that a number of European states have established a supreme financial author-
ity with broad powers over the different branches of the finance business.61
Such an agency is the basis for a level playing field in the European Union
because therefore you need strong public authorities in each member state
which supervise the capital markets. The idea of a European Financial Ser-
vices Supervision Authority is highly controversial though.62 Due to the high
cost caused by 27 different supervising authorities large banks demand for
such a “lead supervisor”. The German Government still resists this idea.63 At
the moment national authorities are still more effective because there are no
language problems. Certainly a central supervision authority like the Com-
petition Directorate General of the European commission would be “too
much” at this stage.64 It is conceivable though to assign certain supervising
powers to the EC commission as per the examination of rating agencies or the
supervision of the enforcement according to the International Financial Re-
porting Standards (IFRS).65
Nevertheless small amendments may be added even on the national level.
Following the example of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board66 which was introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Germany has 
recently set up an audit control commission independent of the market 
players.67 Furthermore, public control of the annual reports of listed com-
panies has been established. At the lower level this control is exercised by 
an “enforcement authority” and in the last instance by the German authority
for supervision of financial services (the so-called Bundesanstalt für Finanz-
dienstleistungsaufsicht – BaFin).68
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61 Namely Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Austria, Switzerland, England,
Germany, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, cf. Karl-Burkhard Caspari, Allfinanzauf-
sicht in Europe, lecture at the centre of European Commercial Law, Nr. 137, 2003, p. 5.
62 Hanno Merkt, Report G at 64. DJT, 2002 pp. 124 et seq.; Jens-Hinrich Binder/Thomas
N. Broichhausen, ‘Entwicklungslinien und Perspektiven des Europäischen Kapital-
marktrechts’, ZBB 2006, 97; Cruickshank, in: Odiath, The Future for the Global Secu-
rity Market, 1996, pp. 267 et seq.
63 FAZ of Jul. 7, 2006, p. 12.
64 European competition law has not been “renationalised” for anything, see Council Re-
gulation (EC) Nr. 1/2003 of Dec. 16, 2002 on the implementation of the rules on com-
petition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 1.
65 Axel Nawrath, ‘Rahmenbedingungen für den Finanzplatz Deutschland’, ILF Working
Paper series No. 2, 2002, p. 25 et seq.
66 Cf. sec. 191 ff. SOX Act (fn. 1).
67 Cf. Abschlussprüferaufsichtsgesetz (APAG) of Dec. 27, 2004, BGBl. I 2004, 3846. Cf.
Lenz, BB 2004, 1951 et seq; cf. now also §§ 37n–37u WpHG.
68 Cf. Bilanzkontrollgesetz (BilKoG) of Dec. 21, 2004, BGBl. I 2004, 3408.
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There are also other approaches to enforce market participants’ duties. For
instance within the shaming procedure the supervisory authority is allowed
to publish the sanctions taken against a company as a result of the breach 
of capital market rules after the time for appeal has expired. This threat of 
adverse publicity acts preemptively to promote the integrity of financial
markets.69 Another popular form of public sanction in England and the US 70
is the ban of a CEO from his profession because of the violation of capital
market rules. A stronger consideration of these measures by European law is
recommended.
b) Enhancing private claims for compensation?
However Europe has pushed the envelope with the enhancement of private
claims. Within German law, claims for discovery against the other party are
considered illegal. It is a German civil law principle that each party has to
show evidence for its claim on its own.71 Punitive damages are penal in nature
and therefore similar to criminal law from the German understanding. That’s
why they are not suitable for civil law proceedings which are not subject to
the principle of investigation. In England punitive damages are the exception;
in Germany the Federal Court of Justice has refused to recognize American
judgements awarding punitive damages because they are against German
public policy.72 The absence of punitive damages and pre-trial discovery re-
duces the motivation of private parties to file claims. 
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M.J. Möllers/Thomas Wenninger, ‘Informationsansprüche gegen die Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) und das neue Informationsfreiheitsgesetz (IFG)’,
ZHR 170 (2006), 455, 458.
70 Thomas M.J. Möllers, ‘Interessenkollisionen und Treuepflichten von Vertretern des
Bieters bei Übernahme eines Aufsichtsratsmandates der Zielgesellschaft’, ZIP 2006,
1615 ff. See also sec. 305 SOX Act (fn. 1).
71 BGH of Jun. 11, 1990, NJW 1990, 3151; BAG of Dec. 1, 2004, BB 2005, 1168, 1169;
Heinz Thomas/Hans Putzo, ZPO, 27th ed. 2005, § 284 n. 3; Leo Rosenberg/Karl Heinz
Schwab/Peter Gottwald, Zivilprozessrecht, 15th ed. 1993, § 117.VI, pp. 679 et seq.; in the
contrary Rolf Stürner, Die Aufklärungspflicht im Zivilprozess, 1976, p. 92, Rolf Stürner,
ZZP 98, 237; Hans Schlosser, JZ 1991, 599.
72 BGH of Jun. 4, 1992, BGHZ 118, 312 = NJW 1992, 3096, reviewed by Harald Koch 
JZ 1993, 261. See also the recent rejection of the introduction of any punitive damages
approach into German law by the 66. Deutsche Juristentag 2006 (available at
http://www.djt.de/index.php). The discussion was based on the – pro-punitive – writ-
ten opinion given by Gerhard Wagner, Neue Perspektiven im Schadensersatzrecht:
Kommerzialisierung, Strafschadensersatz, Kollektivschaden, Gutachten A für den 66.
Deutschen Juristentag, Munich 2006.
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Although these ways are not passable under German law there are still other
means to strengthen shareholders’ rights. The new Freedom of Information
Act finally enables anyone to gather information from public authorities.73
Nevertheless, it is still unclear how extensively lawyers are able to retrieve 
information from BaFin in order to file compensation claims for investors.
In the US, private individuals do not have the right to access information
concerning control over financial institutions under the US Freedom of In-
formation Act (FOIA).74 This exception to the FOIA also applies to the 
supervision of stock exchanges and consulting firms.75 The reason for this
could be the fact that investors with claims in the United States are able to 
retrieve lots of information through the pre-trial discovery process which 
applies to civil claims.76 Contrary to this, the British Financial Services
Agency (FSA) is explicitly part of the British Freedom of Information Act
(FIA) 2000.77 Since January 1st, 2005 sec. 1(1) of the British FIA 2000 has 
allowed individuals to find out whether an authority has certain information
(the so called “right to know”). As per sec. 2 of FIA 2000, this right to infor-
mation is limited if contrary public interests are concerned. Sec. 21 et seq. of
FIA 2000 contain such facts of exclusion. The right to information does not
apply under the absolute exclusion for matters of national security and court
files.78 Other public interest considerations require a balance to be found be-
tween the public interests arguing for and against a disclosure (so called 
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73 Informationsfreiheitsgesetz (IFG) of Sept. 5, 2005, BGBl. I 2005, 2722.
74 Freedom of Information Act 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552 (b) (8) says: “This section does not apply
to matters that are […] contained in or related to examination, operating or condition
reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regula-
tion or supervision of financial institutions”. The FOIA is online available at www.
usdoj.gov/oip/foia_updates/Vol_XVII_4/page2.htm.
75 Mermelstein v. SEC, 629 F. Supp. 672, 673 ff (D.D.C. 1986); Berliner, 962 F. Supp. at
1352; cf. FOIA Guide 2004 Edition Exemption 8.
76 The pre-trial discovery-process commits the party without evidence for the prosecu-
tion to clarify the facts, F.R.C.P. 65 as well as § 21 D(b)(3)(B) Securities Exchange Act.
In detail Peter Hay, US-Amerikanisches Recht, 2000, n. 162 et seq.; Stefan H. Elsing,
US-amerikanisches Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht, 1985, pp. 44 ff.; Hans-Viggo von
Hülsen, ‘Gebrauch und Mißbrauch US-amerikanischer “pre-trial discovery” und die
internationale Rechtshilfe’, RIW 1982, 225; Alexander Mentz, ‘Das “Pre-Trial Dis-
covery” Verfahren im US-amerikanischen Zivilprozessrecht’, RIW 1981, 73; Abbo 
Junker, Discovery im deutschen-amerikanischen Rechtsverkehr, 1987, p. 39 et seq.;
Rieckers, ‘Europäisches Wettbewerbsverfahren und US-amerikanische Discovery’,
RIW 2005, 19 et seq.
77 Compare Freedom of Information Order 2003 (Stat. Instrument 2003 No. 1882),
Sched. 1 Art. 2.
78 Sec. 23 FIA und Sec. 32(1) FIA 2000.
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“public interest test”). So far the German BaFin has been reluctant to address
requests for information under the new German Freedom of Information
Act. Yet, the British experience may be helpful in these cases.79
c) Americanisation of corporate criminal law?
It is debatable to what extent criminal proceedings against corporate CEOs
should be increased. Even in Germany members of the management board
have recently been convicted of criminal charges when knowingly abusing
their position of power to impair shareholders. America has had WorldCom,
Enron and Tyco, Germany has had Comroad,80 Infomatec,81 and EM.TV.82 In
Germany even in the past the management board had the civil responsibility
for the correctness of the annual reports.83 In addition to this civil liability a
CEO could get a maximum of three years imprisonment under sec. 311 no. 1
Commercial Code (HGB). According to sec. 400 para. 1 sentence 1 of the
Stock Corporation Act (AktG) he is liable for an incorrect presentation of the
annual account. The requirement of a CEO to certify the annual report is not
only valid in the United States but also exists in the European Union as per
Art. 50b of the Transparency Directive 2006/46/EC.84 Although the directive
does not require it, Germany punishes wrongful certifications of annual re-
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79 For more details see Thomas M.J. Möllers/Thomas Wenninger, ‘Informationsan-
sprüche gegen die Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) und das
neue Informationsfreiheitsgesetz (IFG)’, ZHR 170 (2006), 455, 464 et seq.
80 The former CEO of Comroad AG, Bodo Schnabel, was convicted to a prison sentence
of seven years by the LG Munich, see LG München I of Nov. 11, 2002, NStZ 2004, 291.
81 LG Augsburg of Nov. 27, 2003, NStZ 2005, 109; see BGH Mar. 30, 2005 – 1 StR 537/04.
The judgement of the second CEO by the LG was not made public.
82 Against the Haffa brothers see BGH of Dec. 16, 2004, NJW 2005, 445 – EM.TV; 
approving the finality of § 400 AktG, BVerfG of Apr. 27, 2006, ZIP 2006, 1096 –
EM.TV.
83 § 823 para. 2 BGB in connection with § 400 AktG, BGH of Sept. 19, 2001, BGHZ 149,
10, 20 et seq. – Bremer Vulkan. For the ad-hoc publicity BGH of Dec. 16, 2004, NJW
2005, 445, 449 – EM.TV.
84 Art. 50b Dir. 78/660/EEC in the version of the Dir. 2006/46/EC of Jun. 14, 2006, OJ 
L 224, 1, says: “Member States shall ensure that the members of the administrative, 
management and supervisory bodies of the company have collectively the duty to 
ensure that the annual accounts, the annual report and, when provided separately, the
corporate governance statement to be provided pursuant to article 46a are drawn up
and published in accordance with the requirements of this Directive and, where
applicable in accordance with the international accounting standards adopted in ac-
cordance with Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002.”
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ports with up to three years imprisonment in a special section of the Com-
mercial Code.85
However it is not justified to export the penalties of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
with up to 25 years of imprisonment to Europe.86 The principle of propor-
tionality87 prevailing in Germany and all other European legal systems is 
crucial. The degree of a penalty must fit in with the principle of proportio-
nality88. As well as the death penalty is unthinkable in Europe,89 imprison-
ment of 25 years or more contravenes the European understanding of a fair
verdict in cases where “only” financial damages are at stake.90 In the “Man-
nesmann” proceedings, the public prosecutor charged six leading German
managers and unionists with betrayal of confidence against the company they
chaired. One of the accused was Deutsche Bank chairman Josef Ackermann
who was a member of the Mannesmann supervisory board. Ackermann ap-
proved a bonus in the amount of 57 million Euro to Mannesmann’s executive
committee after British cellular phone company Vodafone has taken over the
German Mannesmann Group. The district court closed the proceedings
against the payment of 3, 2 million Euro,91 even though the German Federal
Court of Justice had considered it as illegal that such a bonus is arranged after
the successful takeover of the company.92 The real reason for absolving
Ackermann may have been proportionality. Without any doubt the United
States authorities would not have opened criminal proceedings at all.
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85 § 331 Sec. 3a HGB; Cordula Heldt/Sascha Ziemann, ‘Sarbanes-Oxley in Deutschland?’,
NZG 2006, 652 et seq.; Holger Fleischer, ‘Der deutsche “Bilanzeid” nach § 264 Abs. 2
Satz 3 HGB’, ZIP 2007, 97 et seq.
86 Sec. 301 SOX Act (fn. 1).
87 Art. 1 of the Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, as amended by
Protocol No. 11.
88 Cf. BVerfG of Feb. 26, 1969, BVerfGE 25, 269, 286; BVerfG of Jan. 16, 1979, BVerfGE
50, 125, 133; BVerfG of Jun. 15, 1989, BVerfGE 80, 244, 255; BVerfG of Jun. 3, 1992,
BVerfGE 86, 288, 313; Schulze-Fielitz, in: Dreier, GG, 20, Art. 20 n. 180; Roland He-
fendehl, ‘Corporate Governance und Business Ethics: Scheinberuhigung oder Alter-
nativen bei der Bekämpfung der Wirtschaftskriminalität?’, JZ 2006, 119, 120.
89 Schwarze, European Administrative Law, 1992, pp. 685 ff.; Paul Craig/Gráinne de Búrca,
EU Law, 3rd ed. 2002, pp. 371 ff.
90 Human dignity protected by constitutional law in Germany foresees that even the 
murderer has a right to retrieve his freedom, BVerfG of Jun. 21, 1977, BVerfGE 45, 187,
229 et seq. and § 57a StGB.
91 FAZ No. 279 of Nov. 30, 2006, p. 13.
92 BGH of Dec. 21, 2005, NJW 2006, 522.
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IV. Searching for a common standard in corporate governance 
and capital markets law
1. What Europeans and Americans could learn from each other
This paper also intends to make a few observations on the comparison of
laws. European capital market law has been strongly influenced by American
law. This applies particularly to the model of how information is handled:
quoted companies have numerous duties to inform investors so that they can
make well-informed investment decisions. The EDGAR-system in the US
has, without doubt, advantages. A central  European information system in
one single language as in the US is still a dream.93 Sanctions such as shaming
and the banning of CEOs seem to make sense due to their deterrent effect.
Audit control commissions independent from the market-players secure a
differentiated quality control.94 The requirement that the CEO has to certify
the annual report is not only valid in the United States but also in Germany
and soon in all member states as per Art. 50b of the Directive 78/660/EEC.95
There are, however differences in the respective cultures of law so that a blind
adoption of all American legal rules will not make sense at all. In particular,
this applies to the stiff punishment within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. There is
severe criticism of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Companies’ expenses are notably
higher than before.96 According to the view held here, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act has advantages and also disadvantages. Furthermore, certain regulations
are not new for many European states, for example the institution of audit
committees. According to German law, supervisory boards have been able 
to set up such audit committees. The independence of auditors from the 
managing board has also been guaranteed by law, so in this field German law
has proven to be more progressive than US law.97 Sec. 404 SOX forces the
companies to implement internal controls.98 In contrast, Art. 46a Directive
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94 See above III.3.a).
95 See III.3.a).
96 For a more detailed survey cf. Roberta Romano, ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Making of Quack Corporate Governance’, 114 Yale L.Rev. 1520 (2005).
97 For comparison § 107 para. 3 AktG as well as German Corporate Governance Kodex
Sec. 5.3.2.; cf. Eberhard Scheffler, ‘Aufgaben und Zusammensetzung von Prüfungs-
ausschüssen (Audit Committees)’, ZGR 2003, 236, 245 et seq.; Holger Altmeppen, ‘Der
Prüfungsausschuss – Arbeitsteilung im Aufsichtsrat’, ZGR 2004, 390 et seq.; Uwe Hüf-
fer, AktG, 6th ed. 2004, § 107 n. 16.
98 Clyde Stoltenberg/Kathleen A. Lacey/Barbara/Crutchfield George/Michael Cuthbert,
(above fn. 19), 53 Am.J. of Comp.L , 459, 464 et seq.
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78/660/EEC is much more flexible because it gives companies the right to
“comply or explain” if they depart from a corporate governance code.99
Compared to European law the American Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) and the duty of ad-hoc publicity are unsatisfactory.100 In
the past the publication of information related to rates and stock prices was
quite permissive for companies. The issuer was granted four business days to
issue a report. Saturdays, Sundays and holidays had explicitly been exclud-
ed.101 Sec. 409 Sarbanes-Oxley Act now introduces a general duty of ad-hoc
publicity (Real Time Issuer Disclosures) under sec. 13 (1) Securities Exchange
Act.102 There is no norm about the immediateness of disclosures. In this field
the US law could learn from the stricter European standard.103 Moreover, the
balance of the obligation of well-grounded and clearly formulated financial
analyses and the freedom of speech is still unsatisfactory.104
Comparing both cultures, US law seems to grant more freedom to market
participants than European law but breaching the US rules may lead to strict
and sometimes even draconian punishment. In contrast, the European path
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99 Art. 46a lit. (b) Dir. 78/660/EC (fn. 84) says: “To the extent to which a company, in 
accordance with national law, departs from a corporate governance code referred to
under points (a)(i) or (ii), an explanation by the company as to which parts of the 
corporate governance code it departs from and the reasons for doing so. Where the
company has decided not to apply any provisions of a corporate governance code re-
ferred to under points (a)(i) or (ii), it shall explain its reasons for doing so”.
100 For an overview cf. Holger Fleischer, Bericht F für den 64. DJT, 2002; Thomas M.J.
Möllers, ‘Changing European Capital Market Law – Newest Developments under a
comparative law perspective’, 30 N.C.J.Int’L. R. & Com. Reg., 279–334 (2004).
101 The relevant provision for Form 8-K Current Report states: “Unless otherwise
specified, a report is to be filed or furnished within four business days after occurrence
of the event. If the event occurs on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday on which the Com-
mission is not open for business, then the four business day period shall begin to run
on, and include the first business day thereafter.“ Cf. Form 8-K Current Report, Pur-
suant to Section 13 or 15 8d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Online available
at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf.
102 Sec. 409 SOX Act (fn. 1) says: “Each issuer reporting under sec. 13 (a) or 15 (d) shall
disclose to the public on a rapid and current basis such additional information con-
cerning material changes in the financial condition or operations of the issuer, in plain
English, which may include trend and qualitative information and graphic presenta-
tions, as the Commission determines, by rule, is necessary or useful for the protection
of investors and in the public interest.”
103 Cf. Thomas M.J. Möllers, ‘Zur „Unverzüglichkeit“ einer Ad-hoc-Mitteilung im Kon-
text nationaler und europäischer Dogmatik’, in: Festschrift Norbert Horn, 2006, 
pp. 473 et seq.
104 See II.2.
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could be to articulate further legal duties and supervision as well as to adopt
enforcement standards strictly along the principle of proportionality. The
proceedings in re Ackermann show this very clearly. 
2. Cooperation in commercial law questions
a) Cooperation within Europe
Harmonisation of law in Europe is a process of continuous mutual learning.
Some European directives are primarily influenced by English law,105 others
are dominated by the German approach.106 This forces every member state to
deal with so far unknown concepts of law. In addition, the process of har-
monisation within the EU will facilitate enforcement by creating better and
more uniform law. The most important example is comitology. Comitology
stands for a close cooperation of the national authorities at the level of creat-
ing and implementing European rules.107 Comitology proceedings have been
used for creating technical standards for years. Same counts for the field of
international accounting.108 Now, the European legislator started using ex-
ternal expertise in the area of capital market law systematically. Regular 
meetings of the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), the
European Securities Committee (ESC) and the Committee of European Bank-
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105 Cf. Dir. 2004/25/EC on takeover bids of Apr. 21, 2004, OJ L 142, 12 or Dir. 93/22/
EEC on investment services in the securities field of May 10, 1993, OJ L 141, 27.
106 Cf. Dir. 86/653/EEC on self-employed commercial agents of Dec. 18, 1986, OJ L 382,
31, 17 and Second Directive on Company Law Dir. 77/91/EEC of 13.12.1976, OJ 
Nr. L 26, 1; see Thomas M.J. Möllers, The Role of Law in European Integration, 2003,
pp. 73 ff.; Klaus J. Hopt, ‘Company law in the European Union: Harmonization and/
or Subsidiarity’, 1 International & Comp.Corporate L.J., 41 (1999); Oliver Remien,
‘Über den Stil des Europäischen Privatrechts – Versuch einer Analyse und Prognose’,
60 RabelsZ 1, 7 (1996).
107 Cf. Report of wise men of Feb. 15, 2001 by Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy, online at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/
final-report-wise-men_de.pdf; see Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market,
2004; Hans Ulrich Schmolke, ‘Der Lamfalussy-Prozess im Europäischen Kapital-
marktrecht – eine Zwischenbilanz’, NZG 2005, 912.
108 By IFRS Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 of Jul. 19, 2002 concerning the use of inter-
national accounting standards, OJ EC No. L 243, 1 the commission refers to rules of
private law, so for instance the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
Cf. Martin Wulf/Michael Klein/Karim Azaiz, ‘Umstellung des Konzernabschlusses
auf IFRS’, DStR 2005, 260, 263; Thomas M. J. Möllers, ‘Gesellschafts- und Unterneh-
mensrecht, kleinere und mittlere Unternehmen’, in: Reiner Schulze/Manfred Zuleeg,
Handbuch der Europäischen Rechtspraxis, 2006, § 18 n. 75 et seq.
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ing Supervisors (CEBS) facilitate the harmonisation and making of European
Union-wide rules. Now a strong coordination of the interpretation and exe-
cution must follow so that the adopted rules will not fall apart again.109
b) Cooperation between the US and Europe in multinational 
or binational organisations
Most recently Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel has demanded a stron-
ger cooperation between Europe and the United States and even expressed
the idea of creating structures similar to a domestic market between the
European Union and the US.110 Europeans and Americans are working to-
gether in numerous supranational institutions, such as the WTO, World
Bank or the G8 summits. Bilateral agreements exist on taxation and there is
close cooperation in antitrust issues.111
On this basis we will be able to learn from each other. The European IFRS
rules112 have been adopted in Switzerland and in Australia.113 In Europe, the
duties of financial analysts and regulations of ad-hoc disclosures seem to be
further developed than in the US.114 The US may reconsider the certification
requirement for annual reports especially regarding the high penal sanc-
tions.115 Same counts for the obligations according to sec. 404 SOX since 
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109 It is controversial between the different member states how fast ad-hoc disclosures
have to be delivered, if for instance a week-end service can be required from the com-
panies listed on the stock exchange, see Thomas M.J. Möllers, ‘Zur “Unverzüglich-
keit” einer Ad-hoc-Mitteilung im Kontext nationaler und europäischer Dogmatik’, in:
Festschrift Norbert Horn, 2006, pp. 473 et seq.
110 See FAZ No. 22 of Jan. 26, 2007, p. 17 (report from the World Economic Forum in
Davos); before, the so-called association of German industry (BDI) asked for the
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111 Cooperation between the American and European cartel offices makes it clear that
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europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/othersen_us.pdf; Parisi, ‘Enforcement Co-
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112 See fn. 108.
113 Georg Dreyling, ‘Bedeutung internationaler Gremien für die Fortentwicklung des 
Finanzplatzes Deutschland’, ILF Working Paper series No. 4, 2002, p. 10.
114 As to the duty of ad-hoc disclosure see fn. 100 and 103. As to financial analysis see
Thomas  M.J. Möllers, in: Kölner Kommentar, zum WpHG, 2007, § 34b n. 40 et seq.
115 See fn. 3. The EU demands a statement about the adherence to basic principles of Cor-
porate Governance in its management report. So far this is only a proposal, without 
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today many companies are reluctant to be listed116 on a US Stock Exchange or
even plan on delisting.117 We also find a policy of convergence between the
two legal systems regarding civil damages. The US are about to limit punitive
damages.118 The evidence standard for damages regarding liability claims due
to wrongful information on the capital market has recently been strengthen-
ed by the Supreme Court in order to solve the problem caused by abusive 
legal actions of investors.119
Cooperation within the International Organization of Securities Commis-
sioners (IOSCO) is inevitable, although – or even because – the USA and 
Europe go different ways. The joint development of new standards, for in-
stance for rating agencies, appears to be just as important. The IOSCO-prin-
ciples120 and the Code Fundamentals121 contain regulations about how to deal
appropriately with conflicting interests as well as the duty to notify the issuer
before the disclosure of a rating. These are important first steps.122 The US as
well as the European Union123 should soon follow with legally binding regu-
lations,124 especially due to the fact that the meaning of ratings on the capital
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Creating Standards in a Global Financial Market
market is higher than that of certain financial analyses.125 In the last few years
Europe and the US have already started a “Regulatory Dialogue” to check
the effects of the rules taken into consideration already at the beginning of the
law making process.126 It should be discussed in this context how and to what
extent the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will be adopted in the course of an eventual
merger of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Euronext.127
The IOSCO is also a model for the development of international standards.
In comparison to the prevailing dominance of one single legal system, the
competition of different legal systems has made some considerable headway.
With national markets growing closer and closer, common standards of law
become indispensable. Therefore, creating standards in a cooperative way
should become the normal law making procedure.128
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